INTRODUCTION
In modern welfare states, provision of employment is often one of the important mandates of the government. But the government has often played two roles -as a provider of employment through public works as well as a guarantor of employment rights. Although governmentprovided employment is not meant to substitute for market employment, public works programmes can provide a strong social safety net for the unemployed and underemployed. In this paper, we examine the issue of participation in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 1 the largest employment programme in the world (World Bank 2015) , which guarantees right to employment in India. The MGNREGA, enacted in 2005, promises not less than 100 days of wage employment in a financial year to every rural household whose adult members are willing to engage in unskilled manual work. Initially, the Act was intended to cover 200 backward districts in India, but subsequently its scope was extended to all rural areas. Two critical objectives of the Act and subsequent implementation guidelines are (a) ensuring livelihood security for the most vulnerable people living in rural areas, 2 through providing employment opportunities for unskilled manual work and (b) aiding in the empowerment of marginalised communities, especially women, Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
MGNREGA is a universal public works programme, but it has a strong underlying targeting mechanism because entry into the programme is by self-selection. Self-selection could affect the take-up of the programme and in turn influence labour market dynamics. The Government of India has made a massive financial commitment to this programme. In 2016-17, Rs 38,500 crore (0.32 per cent of GDP as per the revised estimates) was allocated to MGNREGA, and a total of 2.35 billion person-days of employment were created (CBGA 2017; Sarkar and Islary 2017) . However, despite the promise of 100 days of employment, the average number of days of employment provided under MGNREGA peaked at 54 days in 2009-10 and has been declining since. It has been hovering below the 50 days mark for the most part (Desai et al. 2015 ). An analysis of programme participation into MGNREGA can provide both theoretical insights into how employment guarantee programmes work in general, as well as wider policy lessons. Specifically, we ask two questions: (a) which households are more likely to participate in this programme and what are their prior characteristics? (b) what are the intra-household dynamics of participation, especially with respect to gender and age? Answers to these two questions provides an assessment of the success of the objectives of MGNREGA mentioned previously. Our analysis offers new insights by using a nationally representative longitudinal data set, the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), with information from both the pre-and post-MGNREGA periods for the same households.
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Since MGNREGA was passed, there has been a voluminous literature on its features, design and impact on several outcomes of economic importance. Both quantitative and qualitative studies have examined the performance of MGNREGA in various geographic regions, ranging from a single state to three or four states to an all-India level. Thematically these studies have covered programme features and challenges (Dreze and Khera 2011; Roy 2015) , rationing (Dutta et al. 2012 (Dutta et al. , 2014 Das 2015) , its impact on employment and wages (Azam 2012; Berg et al. 2012; Desai et al. 2015; Imbert and Paap 2015; Zimmerman 2015) , incomes (Jha et al. 2009 ), welfare (Deininger and Liu 2013; Imbert and Paap 2015) , migration (Liu and Barret 2012; Novotny et al. 2013; Imbert and Paap 2014) , agriculture (Bhargava 2014; Varshney et al. 2014 ), children's education (Afridi et al. 2016 ) and women's empowerment (Khera and Nayak 2009; Sudarshan 2011; Desai et al. 2015 ).
We engage with those studies in this burgeoning literature on MGNREGA that are linked closely to research questions regarding programme participation. There is well-documented evidence that welfare programmes suffer from the phenomenon of 'elite capture' (von Barun 1995; Barett and Clay 2003) and that elite capture can have negative consequences (Besley et al. 2004) . At the same time, studies that examine the issue of targeting in welfare programmes suggest that programmes that have self-selection and demand-driven features work well, avoiding the problems associated with targeting (Besely and Coate 1992; Ravallion 2003) .
In case of MGNREGA, evidence of elite capture in the allocation of work has been documented. Jha et al. (2009) , using primary data of 900 households from Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan, show the capture of MGNREGA by landed classes in Andhra Pradesh. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2012) also find evidence of political clientelism at work. However, other studies have argued that MGNREGA has been quite successful in targeting marginalised sections of society. Ghosh (2009) argues that MGNREGA involves more women, SCs and STs as workers. Deininger and Liu (2013) offer evidence of pro-poor targeting of the programme. Sudarshan (2011) also finds that in Kerala there has been some shift out of agriculture into MGNREGA mainly for female workers because of the higher wages paid under the programme. The administrative data released by the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) and National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) Survey Reports (NSSO 2011) also suggest that MGNREGA is successful as a self-targeting programme, with a high degree of participation from marginalised groups. At the national level, the share of SCs and STs in the work provided under MGNREGA has been high, at 40-50 per cent across each year of the scheme's implementation. 3 Not only have the marginalised sections been participating more in the programme, but they have derived more benefits as well. Several studies have investigated the impact of MGNREGA on the welfare of the poor. Berg et al. (2012) find the wage effect of MGNREGA to be positive across different implementation stages even after controlling for district and time-fixed effects, rainfall and the implementation phase. Klonner and Oldiges (2014) find large, season-specific effects among a traditionally deprived sub-group of the rural population, whose incomes are particularly dependent on agricultural wage labour. Ghosh (2009) , Dreze and Khera (2011), Sudarshan (2011) and Dutta et al. (2012) examine the welfare gains of marginalised communities. They argue that since a majority of the world's poor live in rural areas and the poorest of the poor are agricultural wage workers, a rural public work programme like MGNREGA in India constitutes an important anti-poverty tool for all rural labour via both its direct employment effects and its indirect wage effects.
The other important issue linked to participation is that of the extent of participation and regional variation. The edited volume by Khera (2011) and Dreze and Khera (2011) document several qualitative case studies, highlighting the positive impact of MGNREGA as well as the challenges faced in implementing the Act. Two issues emerging from this review are particularly noteworthy. First, MGNREGA has become an important component of employment for rural Indians, although it remains as a supplement to other work, with only 3.45 per cent of the households engaging in the full 100 days of work per year (Ministry of Rural Development 2014). Second, the distribution of MGNREGA participation is highly uneven across states. As far as this uneven variation in MGNREGA participation across states is concerned, Roy (2015) suggests a variety of factors -commitment of local elites, geographical variations and political economy of programme implementation -that are responsible for this. Chopra (2015) analyses the puzzle of differing performance across states using a qualitative study of the programme implementation in four Indian states (Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Assam) and links varying performance to differing political commitment in each state. Reddy et al. (2010) too, in their study, find that commitment, capacity and preparedness of local governance structures impact the effectiveness of the programme.
Some studies point at corruption as the reason for lacklustre implementation of MGNREGA and low participation. Kapur (2010) and Niehaus and Sukhatankar (2012) report instances of underpayment of wages on account of over-reporting and wage skimming by administrators. Muralidharan et al. (2016) show the positive impact of biometrically authenticated payment infrastructure on wage payments in MGNREGA.
The unevenness in programme participation would be a cause for concern if richer households or richer villages were able to disproportionately capture MGNREGA work, thereby leaving out the poor. Dutta et al. (2012) examine the unmet demand for MGNREGA work using the National Sample Survey (NSS) 66th Round data. They too find that MGNREGA participation rates vary across states, as observed by Dreze and Khera (2011) . They suggest that this variation is on account of two effects: the first is an indirect effect of greater poverty via higher demand for MGNREGA work and the second is the direct effect of having greater unmet demand for work on the programme. They show that rationing of work takes place on the ground. However, they conclude that despite the unmet demand of poor families and rationing, the self-targeting mechanism of the Act works well, enabling it to reach relatively poor and backward families. Narayanan et al. (2016) also highlight administrative rationing, leading to 'discouraging worker effect' and variation in participation rates.
Public works programmes involve huge commitments of financial resources. This gives rise to the possibility of uneven distribution, namely either richer households or richer villages disproportionately capturing MGNREGA work, leaving out the poor. This poses serious challenges to the programme design.
One problem encountered while examining the effectiveness of the programme with regard to participation, in general, and that of SCs/STs or women, in particular, is that programme participation is often affected by factors correlated with caste and gender. For example, seasonal work available through MGNREGA may be more attractive to marginal farmers who do not have year-round work, but may hold little attraction for people who have a steady job in a nearby town. However, both landownership as well as farm productivity are correlated with caste (Desai et al. 2010) . Adivasis living in remote areas may have few other job opportunities, while people belonging to forward castes living in the more developed regions may have little need to rely on MGNREGA. In this case, the higher participation of STs in MGNREGA should also be examined in comparison to that of their forward-caste counterparts living in similar areas in order to examine programme targeting at the local level.
Another important issue is that of the income status of the participant households. Since MGNREGA provides employment and thereby income generation for poor households, their current poverty and employment status is endogenous to the issue of programme participation. Hence in examining programme participation issues, it is necessary to look at the income of the households before their participation in the MGNREGA programme.
Also, even when a marginalised household participates in the MGNREGA programme, we do not know who participates within the household and whether their gender and age have any bearing on participation, since the 100-day limit is operative at the household level. Existing literature does not tell us anything about this intra-household dynamics of participation. This paper fills the gap in the existing literature by addressing all the above-mentioned issues related to participation by utilising a unique panel data set from IHDS. We look at the issue of programme participation holistically and compare participation of marginalised SC/ST households to that of forward and other caste households. We also look at the pro-poor targeting aspect of the programme by including the previous income of the participating households, thereby avoiding the conflation of current income and current participation. Since there is evidence of regional variation in programme participation, we also control for unobserved state-and village-level heterogeneity. Lastly, we examine the choice of intra-household participation by individuals, by looking at the gender and age of individuals of the participating households. Thus, our results provide a more robust picture of participation as compared to previous studies.
DATA
The data for this study was taken from the nationally representative multitopic IHDS. This panel survey was conducted during two rounds: IHDS-I in 2004-05 and IHDS-II in 2011-12. IHDS-I and IHDS-II are part of a collaborative research programme between the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and the University of Maryland with the goal of documenting changes in the daily lives of Indian households in the context of a society undergoing rapid transition. The surveys were conducted in all the states and union territories (UTs) in India except the UTs of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep. IHDS thus gathered detailed village-, household-and individual-level information about a range of socio-economic and demographic variables, viz. income, employment, consumption expenditure, education, gender relations, social networks, marriage, youth, health and fertility.
The unique feature of the IHDS data set is that the same households were visited during both rounds of the survey. This paper utilises the household panel from both rounds of IHDS data covering about 42,000 households, of which about two-thirds are rural. We have included only rural households for our analysis as MGNREGA is operational only in rural areas. The aggregate re-contact rate of IHDS for the rural areas between the two rounds is 90 per cent. There was a loss of 2,754 households due to attrition in rural areas, but attrition does not significantly affect the representativeness of our sample.
Analyses of IHDS-I (Desai et al. 2010 ) and IHDS-II reveal that on most major parameters like poverty, literacy and work participation, the national rates derived by IHDS are comparable to those of NSS and the Census. In the context of this paper, it would suffice to note that the MGNREGA participation rate obtained by using the IHDS panel is comparable to the participation rate obtained from NSS data (NSSO 2011; Dutta et al. 2012) . Dutta et al. (2012) calculated the MGNREGA participation rate to be 24.9 per cent during 2009-10 while the IHDS finds it to be 24.4 per cent during the preceding year, 2011-12 (Table 1) . The IHDS data are well suited for analysis of MGNREGA for several reasons, as listed below:
• Since the initial survey was conducted in 2004-05, just before the initiation of MGNREGA, IHDS could examine the impact of the initial household conditions in shaping programme participation.
• IHDS contains more detailed economic information than is available in the NSS.
o IHDS collected not only consumption data as is done for the NSS but also detailed income data. For instance, IHDS collected separate data on income from farm and non-farm business activity, enabling us to investigate the role of levels and sources of income on MGNREGA participation.
o IHDS also collected data on household assets, a predictor of long-term economic status (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) , which the analyses presented in later sections show to be the strongest economic predictor of MGNREGA participation.
• The panel structure is particularly useful in avoiding problems of endogeneity for evaluating the targeting of low-income households. Cross-sectional analyses entail an additional risk of confounding the effects of MGNREGA participation with its causes.
• Unlike NSSO surveys, IHDS also contains information on village infrastructure, allowing us to compare the role of MGNREGA in the developed and less developed villages. well as individual levels, taking into account the initial household income, income composition and initial employment status of various household members, particularly women.
METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
For household-level analyses, we use a binary logit model with the MGNREGA participation status of the household as the dependent variable. 4 The variables on the right-hand side include a mix of continuous and categorical variables serving as indicators of household characteristics such as assets, total income, educational qualifications, sources of income, caste and religion, among other things.
Targeting of disadvantaged households may occur in two ways: (1) since the disadvantaged households often live in poor areas, geographic targeting (as with the phased implementation of MGNREGA) may indirectly help the disadvantaged households and (2) there may be direct targeting of marginalised households within any given area.
In order to examine the targeting, we undertake three sets of analyses at the household level:
(1) First, we estimate models of whether a household participates in MGNREGA at an all-India level without including any state-level control variables. This allows us to examine total targeting of disadvantaged households at an all-India level. The basic specification takes the following form:
where the probability of participation in MGNREGA by the i-th household in 2011-12 is a function of j variables measured in 2004-05 and k variables measured in 2011-12. Since economic status is both a function of and determinant of MGNREGA participation, the variables denoting economic status -household income, sources of income, ownership of consumer assets and education level -are drawn from IHDS-I conducted in 2004-05 before MGNREGA was implemented. Household structure variables -the number of adults in the household and social group -are drawn from the 2011-12 survey.
(2) Then, we model the effect of state of residence and whether the village is more developed or less developed in order to account for geographical variation. For India, as a whole, disadvantaged households may enjoy greater access to MGNREGA because they live in disadvantaged states or in poorer villages within those states. Comparisons of the household coefficients in the two models will reveal how much of the targeting was accomplished simply by focusing on the poorer states and less developed villages. This model is specified as: (2) where s denotes state of residence and whether the village can be classified as less developed or more developed. Less developed villages are defined as those that have six or fewer infrastructure facilities from a list of 10 facilities listed in Table A.1. (3) However, our controls for village characteristics and state of residence do not encompass the full range of potential differences between different geographical areas and individual characteristics may act as a proxy for these regional differences. For example, it is well recognised that STs are often located in poorer districts and areas without good transportation access. In order to control for this geographical diversity and look at differences by caste and income within the village, we estimate a village-level fixed effects model: ) where μ v reflects the intercept for each village. This is equivalent to adding a dummy variable for each village. These models are estimated by using STATA command xtlogit with a village-level fixed effects specification.
The village-level fixed effects model allows us to control all unobserved village characteristics to focus only on the impact of household characteristics within the villages. There may still be some elite capture within some villages where the more powerful households manage to secure the limited work available. The fixed effects model tests whether, even within a village, the more disadvantaged households have greater access to MGNREGA work.
Since households are constrained to a total of 100 days per year of work in MGNREGA, gender, age and marital status may determine which person within the household is chosen to participate in the programme.
As MGNREGA pay does not allow gender or age wage differentials, we expect women, the elderly and the very young to be disproportionately selected by households for MGNREGA work. This would then free primeage males, who are better paid in the market economy, to seek market work. These age and gender differences have been estimated by using a household-level fixed effects regression.
Pr (MGNREGA pi )/Pr (1 -MGNREGA pi ) = exp (α 0 + β p X pi + μ i ) (4) where the probability of MGNREGA participation for person p in household i is a function of age, education, gender and marital status of the individual within the household. This framework is similar to the village-level fixed effects model estimated in Equation (3).
Description of variables
One of the strengths of the IHDS survey is the wide range of social and economic data collected for each household. In our analytic models, we test for participation along several dimensions of social and economic disadvantages while holding constant other household and individual characteristics that might also influence MGNREGA participation. We focus on the following sets of variables:
Social background: The caste group (forward castes, other backward classes (OBCs), SCs and STs) and religion (Hindu, Muslim or other) of the household head.
Long-term economic status as measured in 2004-05:
A count of up to 30 assets owned by the household, including possessions ranging from basic assets like a table or a chair to more modern and expensive possessions like a refrigerator or a washing machine. Household assets reflect the underlying economic well-being of that particular household, as possessions accumulated over many years shed better light on a household's long-term economic standing than do annual measures like income, which tend to be volatile. Assets also constitute the economic measure that is most likely to be visible to others in the village, which could act as a deterrent to MGNREGA participation.
Household income and occupation as measured in 2004-05:
Household income quintile; sources of household income, including participation in wage labour, farming and business; and landownership.
Household demographics: The number of adult members in the household and the highest level of education attained by any adult household member.
Individual characteristics: Sex, age and marital status of the individual members of the household.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the results of our analyses. We begin by highlighting the participation across different socio-religious and economic axes in MGNREGA. This is followed by different variants of econometric models described above.
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for all household variables are included in Table 1 . The final column of the table shows the proportion of each category participating in MGNREGA. The overall household participation rate is 24.4 per cent, but Table 1 shows that participation varies widely by caste, religion, income level and other household characteristics. Even wider variation by states is seen, with only 2.9 per cent of the rural households in Maharashtra and Goa reporting MGNREGA participation as compared to a corresponding figure of 60.5 per cent in rural Chhattisgarh. However, it is important to note that the smaller IHDS samples within each state mean larger standard errors for these estimates.
All indices of social or economic position show greater MGNREGA participation among the least privileged. SC and ST households show higher participation rates than OBC households, which, in turn, show slightly more participation than forward-caste households. Households from the bottom three income quintiles participate in the programme at equivalent but higher rates (about 30 per cent) than the top two quintiles. In that sense, MGNREGA is proving to be an important anti-poverty programme as it attracts more poor than rich households. However, its appeal is broader than its appeal to the poor alone, as middle-income households also participate in MGNREGA work at significant rates. In addition, landless households have higher participation rates (25.4 per cent) than large landowners (12.9 per cent). Households depending on farm or non-farm wage labour exhibit higher participation rates than those with salaried incomes. Illiterate households show higher participation rates than those with adults who are graduates or have acquired secondary school level education. Work offered under MGNREGA is low-skill, manual labour. Given this feature of the programme, we note that education, work and income variables have the intended distribution as shown in Table 1 follow the intended lines.
Although descriptive statistics are suggestive, econometric analysis is needed to explore the relationship between participation choice and other variables. Therefore, we run a logistic regression model regressing actual participation on the full range of variables.
Determinants of household-level participation
First, we estimate a household-level logistic regression model for all households given their initial household-level characteristics (that is, in 2005, before MGNREGA began). Table 2 gives the coefficients for a logistic regression at the all-India level, indicating the likelihood of MGNREGA participation. Here the economic variables of direct interest are consumer durables owned in 2004-05 and income in 2004-05. The asset coefficient is negative and significant; households with a relatively large asset base do not participate in the kind of work offered by MGNREGA. There is a strong link between levels of education and poverty. A better educated household has more job opportunities and is in a better position to escape poverty. Since MGNREGA offers only casual unskilled labour work on a temporary basis, a less educated household is more likely to turn to MGNREGA as a source of employment even holding constant their economic level. In Table 2 , the education effect appears to be quite linear with lower levels of participation seen for people with each higher level of education.
MGNREGA operates in rural areas that remain predominantly agrarian even today despite a falling share of agriculture in national income and employment. Since agricultural activities are seasonal in nature, it is vital for the workforce employed in agriculture to have access to alternative channels of employment. The regression results show that households with agricultural wage workers are more likely to participate in MGNREGA than households who cultivate their own land.
5 It thus appears that MGNREGA does act as a source of alternative employment and provider of safety net.
Historically, SCs and STs have lagged behind in overall development and hence have rightly been t h e focal point for this programme. As compared to the forward-caste households, SC and ST households are characterised by less education, income and household assets and are thus favoured for targeting in this programme, which is essentially meant for poor and less educated households. The results in Table 2 show higher S C a n d S T participation even beyond these economic and educational characteristics. This confirms that MGNREGA is succeeding as a selftargeting programme for the most disadvantaged communities.
In contrast to Dalits and Adivasis, Muslims have no significantly different participation rates from economically equivalent majority Hindus. More detailed analyses, not shown here, have shown that Christians tend to have somewhat higher participation rates and Sikhs lower participation rates, but these differences are entirely a function of the high participation rates in the North-East and low rates in Punjab.
State and village fixed effects logistic models
The findings depicted in Table 2 thus clearly indicate that participation in MGNREGA is largely from the marginalised groups. However, some of these results might be due to the strong geographical variation noted in Table 1 , which is not captured by this model. For example, since caste and income vary by place of residence and its economic opportunity structure, the successful targeting of disadvantaged households may derive primarily from targeting disadvantaged regions and villages. Regional targeting could be particularly important for Adivasis since they are most likely to live in remote areas where few alternative job opportunities exist but which were earlier targeted for inclusion in MGNREGA. Adivasis integrated into more developed, mixed-caste rural areas, on the other hand, might not enjoy the same access to MGNREGA employment. In order to estimate how much of the targeting is only a result of the geographical targeting of poorer states and villages, we calculate two additional models that control first for state-level and then village-level differences.
Interestingly, instead of attenuating caste effects, the geographic controls have little or no impact on the estimates of participation levels by Dalits and Adivasis. State-level controls in Table 3 actually slightly raise the estimates of Adivasi participation while slightly lowering the estimates for Dalits. The more extensive village controls reverse those changes but leave the estimates almost equal or even somewhat stronger than in the initial estimates from Table 2 . This indicates that the higher participation rate of Dalits and Adivasis is not a function of Dalit and Adivasi areas getting more programme access but rather of greater programme participation even in mixed locations.
Similar results are also observed for the estimates of economic effects. Both asset levels and income coefficients become larger after state-level controls are added. This suggests that contrary to the initial impressions, MGNREGA participation levels are not especially high in the poor states. Like the poorer states of Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan, the better-off states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and the North-East also register high participation rates. States like Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha, while showing moderate levels of MGNREGA participation (see Table  1 ), have negative coefficients once household-level economic standing is controlled for. Hence, rather than low-income households having high MGNREGA participation rates because they are located in poor states, it appears to be more likely that within each state, it is the low-income households that participate. 127 
Who Participates in MGNREGA?

Individual-level fixed effect logistic model
In addition to providing livelihood security for households, MGNREGA contains a particular focus on women and is expected to ensure that 33 per cent participants are women. In order to examine the success of this objective, we run the household-level fixed effects model to study the intra-household dynamics of MGNREGA participation. For this analysis, we consider individual demographic characteristics, viz. gender, age and marital status. The data utilised for individual-level regression has been taken from MGNREGA-participating households in the second round of the survey (IHDS-II), and the results are presented in Table 4 . It is necessary to compare the individual MGNREGA participation results with similar results for overall work participation. We need to understand not only which individuals participate in MGNREGA, but whether such participation rates are greater or lesser than general work participation in those households. While women are less likely than men to participate in MGNREGA, this disadvantage is smaller than for overall work participation. The female coefficient is -0.55 for MGNREGA participation but -2.18 for overall work participation. This confirms that f e m a l e w o r k e r s f i n d g r e a t e r f a v o u r i n MGNREGA work than in other types of work. This could be because MGNREGA is the only sector where wage equality is enforced; in all other work, women earn substantially less than men. Another explanation for the higher female participation in MGNREGA could be the 33 per cent reservation for female workers in the programme.
The second variable of interest is the age of individual MGNREGA workers. MGNREGA participation shows an inverse U relationship with the youngest and oldest workers least likely to participate in it. However, once again, when compared to the inverse U relationship with overall work participation in the panel, we see that for MGNREGA work, the inverse U is more muted. This suggests that while the youngest and oldest workers are left out of the other sectors, MGNREGA is more open to them. Similarly, though married individuals are most likely to participate in MGNREGA, widows/widowers face fewer disadvantages in MGNREGA work as compared to other types of work.
These results are interesting in that they highlight ways in which labour market opportunities shape household work participation decisions. Adult males who have access to better labour force opportunities than women are not as attracted to MGNREGA as are women and the elderly who have limited opportunities in other kinds of work.
CONCLUSION
We began by asking which households are more likely to participate in the MGNREGA programmes, what their characteristics are and what the intra-household dynamics are with regard to participation patterns. Our results provided an intriguing answer. We found that for the categories of households who otherwise are excluded socially and for those which the Act defines as being marginalised, that is, Dalits and Adivasis (SCs and STs), participation rates are higher. This relationship persists even when we controlled for prior income and consumer assets, sources of income and place of residence, all of which are themselves related to MGNREGA participation. Women are not quite on par with men in MGNREGA Who Participates in MGNREGA?
participation but the disadvantage they faced is much less than what they experienced in other types of work. However, higher participation rates are not observed for groups that have not been explicitly identified, like Muslims.
Like the targeting of socially excluded groups, the economic targeting of MGNREGA seems to have been moderately effective, though there is a broader band of people falling in the low to middle economic groups who have taken advantage of MGNREGA. While the highest income and education groups seem to self-select themselves out of MGNREGA work, there is little gradation among the population in the bottom 60 per cent. This actually speaks about the broad-based support that MGNREGA as a programme enjoys. Moreover, MGNREGA work seems most attractive to agricultural wage labourers, who are familiar with the hard, manual labour offered by MGNREGA.
Although the paper confirms some of the observations made using other data-sets and that of micro-level studies, it strengthens these earlier observations by reinforcing those findings and adding to them using a longitudinal data set that allows us to look at before and after MGNREGA incomes for the same set of households These results provide a useful starting point given current discourses around reforming MGNREGA. Concerns about the high costs of the social programme and a belief that MGNREGA has failed to reach the poorest drives the call for reforms in MGNREGA (Dutta et al. 2014) . In this paper, we offer somewhat different evidence and suggest that despite being plagued by various deficiencies, MGNREGA's achievements are moderately effective in terms of its programme participation and that it would be worthwhile to build on this success instead of reinventing the wheel. 
